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ABSTRACT

Tactical Satellite-3 (TacSat-3) was successfully launched on 19 May 09, and has provided key
insights into hyperspectral imaging capabilities hosted on a small satellite platform. TacSat-3
has given insights into new concepts of operations in the tactical employment of satellites and
the balance between on-board processing, automation and performing these functions on the
ground. System design decisions made early in the program are traced to on-orbit impacts and
contain significant lessons learned for future space missions. In conjunction with the mission
partners such as the Operationally Responsive Space Office TacSat-3 has shown lessons in key
areas of improving responsive space goals. Specific key areas are the relatively rapid checkout
of the spacecraft and lessons from the responsive space development.
down reflected light into hundreds of spectral bands.
These bands can be analyzed to determine the elemental
composition of surfaces or objects on the ground. The
payload was built by Raytheon Space and Airborne
Systems of El Segundo, CA. The spacecraft also
includes two other payloads, the Office of Naval
Research‟s Satellite Communications Package, and
AFRL‟s Space Avionics Experiment. [1]
The
spacecraft bus was built by ATK Spacecraft Systems
and Services of Beltsville, Maryland. Two other key
components of the Space Vehicle were the Sensor
Processor (SP) with hardware built by SEAKR
Engineering of Centennial, CO and software developed
by Space Computer Corporation of Los Angeles, CA;
and a high speed Common Data Link system developed
by L-3 Communications, Communications Systems
West, Salt Lake City, UT.

INTRODUCTION
The Tactical Satellite 3 mission was a flight experiment
designed to demonstrate tactical and traditional space
applications of militarily significant hyperspectral
imagery. Additionally, TacSat-3 was developed in the
infancy of the Responsive Space movement. TacSat-3
was built to push on increasing the capabilities of a
small satellite system within tightly managed
programmatic cost and schedule. Finally, it was to
demonstrate tactical employment of a space asset,
demonstrating the delivery of hyperspectral imagery
products directly to a warfighter after being re-tasked
within the same pass.
TACSAT-3 OVERVIEW
The mission‟s primary payload, the Advanced
Responsive Tactically-Effective Military Imaging
Spectrometer (ARTEMIS) hyperspectral sensor, rapidly
supplies target detection and identification data, as well
as information related to battlefield preparation and
combat damage assessment. This sensor collects
images of objects of interest on the earth and breaks
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Figure 2. ARTEMIS Photograph & Description

Figure 1. Hyperspectral Imagery

The ARTEMIS payload successfully implemented a
number of design and test decisions to meet the
program‟s challenging cost and schedule. These include
(1) significant use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
and tactical-grade electronic components with minimal
redundancy, (2) use of a single spectrometer focal plane
array to expedite laboratory alignment and achieve
stringent spectral/spatial uniformity, (3) use of a OnBoard Health Monitor (OBHM) for trending spectral,
spatial,
and
radiometric
performance,
(4)
implementation of a focus mechanism to achieve onorbit focus of the sensor, and (5) vicarious techniques
for on-orbit spatial and radiometric calibration. These
design decisions enabled the successful development
and delivery of the ARTEMIS sensor by significantly
reducing the cost of hardware components and duration
of pre-launch ground testing.

ARTEMIS Payload
ARTEMIS is the primary payload for the TacSat-3
satellite. Developed by Raytheon, it is a sophisticated
hyperspectral imaging sensor that was designed and
built as a rapid development project for AFRL.
Designated as the satellite‟s main demonstration, the
hyperspectral imager payload provides target detection
and identification information, as well as battlefield
preparation and combat assessment data, within
minutes of its collection. HSI (hyperspectral imaging)
provides unique benefits to the warfighter. The spectral
information in each image lends itself to anomaly
detection in a given scene, spectral matching of
elements within the scene, and ultimately capabilities to
distinguish man-made materials from natural materials.
HSI uses detailed spectral signatures for every pixel to
identify and locate different types of materials,
vegetation, or minerals.
This capability enables
detection of otherwise unseen targets and provides near
real-time intelligence data to field commanders.

TacSat-3 Bus
TacSat-3 was a first step in reaching the long-term
responsive goal of the Operationally Responsive Space
Office (ORS) that modular satellite assembly and test
be accomplished in a matter of days for a fraction of the
cost of current buses. [5] The spacecraft bus includes
the main structure; attitude control system (reaction
wheels and torque rods); the thermal protection system
(heater and blankets); the integrated avionics unit
(flight computer); the power system (battery, solar
arrays, and wire harness); the primary flight software,
which controls and manages the entire space vehicle;
and the primary Telemetry, Tracking, and Control link.
The TacSat-3 Modular Bus was designed and built by
ATK Spacecraft Systems and Services, Beltsville, MD.
It is a three-axis stabilized precision pointing bus that
provides power, thermal control, communication, and
command & control functions for the payloads. The
modular bus enables the collection of hyperspectral
data by flying a precision profile.

The innovative ARTEMIS payload covers the visible
through short-wave infrared spectrum. Its components
include a high-resolution panchromatic imager,
telescope, optics, focal plane array, and control/readout
electronics. In addition to sensor development and
delivery, Raytheon‟s TacSat-3 responsibilities included
integration support and assistance during in-flight
calibration verification.
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AFRL. The main idea was to marry operational user
needs with emerging technologies using a small
spacecraft. The selection process was created with
inputs across all DoD enterprises.
The process
culminated in a joint service selection.
The goal of quick and low cost acquisition shaped the
TacSat-3 program from the beginning.
Funding
limitations and the initial acquisition strategy dictated
that the highest risk component, the HSI sensor, be
acquired first. This sensor was acquired before the rest
of the satellite system, which necessarily set certain
parameters of its design. This was done somewhat in a
vacuum with respect to the rest of the satellite system.
Interface assumptions became major drivers for the rest
of the satellite, and often with detrimental effects.
Primary among these were thermal interface
assumptions and volume allowed for Guidance,
Navigation and Control (GN&C) sensors.

Figure 3. TacSat-3 Modular Bus
This profile projects the ARTEMIS entrance slit along
the ground at a steady rate to build up the along-track
spatial component of the hyperspectral data cube. The
bus avionics receive commands from the ground,
coordinate the payload activities, and monitor thermal
and health status, reacting to the inputs to protect
thermal limits needed for payload stability. Other
features of the spacecraft design include the adoption of
Integrated Systems Engineering Team standard
interfaces, that were developed in parallel by a joint
government-industry team of engineers; an agile threeaxis stabilization system to enable payload sensors to
collect precision data on-orbit and downlink processed
information in the same orbit pass; a robust power
capability with modular power options that can be
tailored for specific mission requirements; and a highstrength structure with adaptable interfaces to support a
variety of sensor payloads. The on-orbit performance
of the bus has been excellent. In particular, the solar
panels have exceeded expectations, providing a positive
power balance for even the most stressing normal
operations.

The primary thermal interface between ARTEMIS and
the bus was assumed to be adiabatic. While great
strides were made to isolate the thermal interface, a
truly adiabatic interface was unachievable. The exact
magnitude of the impact of this assumption has not
been effectively measured.
This „simplifying‟
assumption and the push for leaner acquisition led to
the oversimplification of the thermal modeling for
ARTEMIS. This caused an increased workload on the
bus contractor (who had to incorporate sensor attributes
in a total system model), but more significantly, thermal
impacts on optical design were not borne out before the
operations phase.
Additionally, the leading acquisition of ARTEMIS
resulted in insufficient allocation of volume for
required bus GN&C hardware: namely the Inertial
Reference Unit (IRU). As geolocation was a key
requirement levied on the TacSat-3 system, volume was
allocated for key GN&C sensors such as star trackers
and the IRU to reduce thermal variability between them
and the ARTEMIS boresight. As the instrument design
matured, volume had to be allocated earlier to maintain
cost and schedule. This allocation was performed
without the benefit of knowledge of final volume
requirements from the bus design.

LESSONS LEARNED HIGHLIGHTS
Lessons learned can be categorized within 3 main
phases of the program: Definition/Acquisition,
Integration/Test, and Experiment Operations. A full
treatment of the lessons learned would require much
more discussion than allowed within this paper, but
several highlights for the small spacecraft community
are given.

The Definition and Acquisition Phase continued with
the letting of contracts for the Sensor Processor, the
Common Data Link (CDL), and the spacecraft bus.
The Sensor Processor is the brains of the ARTEMIS
sensor providing the sensor control, data handling and
processing, interface management, and data storage.
The Common Data Link provided the high speed
downlink required for the HSI mission requirements.
Finally, the spacecraft bus provided the infrastructure to

Definition/Acquisition Phase Overview
On 28 Oct 2004, Mr. Peter Teets (Undersecretary of the
Air Force, and DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Space)
approved the selection of a hyperspectral imaging
system as the primary payload for TacSat-3. The
concept was born out of a selection process led by
Straight
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due to added complexity), but demonstrable high level
technology readiness is required.
Similarly, the
Command and Data Handling subsystem must be of a
high enough reliability level to allow for the return of
critical telemetry and receipt of commands. Knowledge
gained from a failed flight experiment is as valuable as
a successful flight experiment.

meet all the mission requirements: primarily Command
& Data Handling (C&DH), Telemetry, Tracking &
Control (TT&C), Power, Structures and subsystem
(non-ARTEMIS) thermal control. These acquisitions
were let through separate contracts centrally managed
by AFRL.
The government (specifically AFRL) took on the role
as prime system integrator. The mistakes in definition
are illustrated by the thermal and volume interface
issues raised above, but the power of this approach also
allowed for key mission assurance saves later in the
mission.
Definition/Acquisition
Highlights

Phase

Lessons

Second, targeted redundancy of the ARTEMIS
cryocooler electronics was used to reduce the risk
exposure of radiation effects on the primary mission.
Two sets of cryocooler electronics were flown with a
simple relay switch between them. Analysis of the
predicted, margined radiation environment showed an
unacceptable risk to the electronics failing before a year
on-orbit. It is telling however, that the switch has yet to
be exercised (to date) as the electronics have not had
any on-orbit failure. Redundancy is a limited option for
small spacecraft and should only be utilized when there
are sufficient mass/power margins and the introduction
of redundancy does not reduce total system reliability.
Total system reliability can be reduced by the switching
mechanism, whose reliability directly reduces total
system reliability.

Learned

As cost and schedule were key drivers, specific risks
were taken in the development of the system. A
primary cost driver was to utilize industrial grade
components versus „Class S‟ parts, primarily for
schedule reasons and to a lesser extent cost reasons.
This was in keeping with the flight experiment nature
of the acquisition, but balancing mission assurance risk
with cost and schedule became a major area for lessons
learned. We were able to balance these to field a
successful mission.
Within the program office, significant review of “COTS
parts” (Commercial Off The Shelf parts) was a primary
theme throughout design and build of the TacSat-3
system (as well as I&T and Operations). As it turns
out, key themes revealed themselves throughout, such
as:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Identify highly susceptible systems and avoid
„risky‟ parts/subsystems in those areas.
Use targeted simple redundancy where
possible in limited circumstances.
Proper and effective communication of risk
acceptance/tolerance to contractors is critical.
As well as, government understanding of risk
prioritization impacts on cost, schedule,
performance and mission assurance.
Radiation susceptibility testing and analysis
can be effective tools if implemented
judiciously.

Figure 4. Tactical Cryocooler and Redundant
Cryocooler Electronics [6]
Third, proper and effective communication of risk
acceptance/tolerance to personnel making build/design
decisions
is
absolutely
essential.
These
communications require thorough descriptions and
discussion of risk definitions among all stakeholders.
Risk definition may be widely different between two
organizations or even sub-organizations. Risks also
have different meanings in different contexts. For
instance, the spacecraft contractor‟s original C&DH
system was deemed too risky, which is why the option
to provide a more robust system was accepted as part of
the winning bid. AFRL was willing to take other risks
throughout the system, but the tolerance in this
particular area was much less as it is a critical
subsystem. As the proposed increased robustness in the
C&DH was determined to be unworkable, a major trade
study in decreasing risk in this area was undertaken. At
the time, increasing the robustness was seen to be
necessary for minimally acceptable mission assurance,

First, establish or know your mission‟s risk posture
sufficiently to locate and avoid „risky‟ parts/subsystems
in key areas. For space flight experiments in AFRL,
this is primarily the TT&C and C&DH subsystems.
Having a rock solid link to the ground is a basic
essential with no other work-arounds. Redundant
systems are not required (and often specifically avoided
Straight
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mission assurance. Additionally, significant synergies
in cost, schedule and risk savings are realized by having
requirements owners (government engineering) and
requirements verification located within the same
facility. TacSat-3‟s original AI&T plan called for the
complete integration and test of sub-components of
ARTEMIS, the SP, the CDL radio, secondary payloads,
the Ground System and the spacecraft bus at Kirtland
AFB, NM.

but contrary to the originally stated higher priority of
controlling cost and schedule.
Effectively
communicating priorities is important, but often these
priorities are based upon a set of assumptions. In this
instance, the government‟s assumption of minimizing
system risk on the C&DH even in the light of
cost/schedule
impacts
was
not
effectively
communicated. Part of this was due to inexperience on
the government team‟s side, and the learning of the
implications for the stated risk priorities. As AFRL
goes forward with future flight systems, the authors
propose the development of a common risk posture for
flight experiments. While this risk posture should not
be rigidly applied in all circumstances, it would provide
both government and contractors a basis for
understanding assumptions and management of risk.

The TacSat-3 payloads and modular bus were designed,
fabricated, and assembled at their respective contractor
locations and then delivered to the AFRL Aerospace
Engineering Facility (AEF) at Kirtland AFB, NM for
integration and space qualification testing. A joint team
of AFRL and ATA Aerospace engineers and
technicians assisted by Raytheon, ATK, L-3
Communications, and other team members assisted in
completing the activities which included design and
fabrication of required tooling, test fixtures, and GSE
(Ground Support Equipment). A full treatment of the
integration and test process on TacSat-3 would be too
great for this paper, but major events are listed. Major
schedule and mission assurance events include the
failure of ARTEMIS during random vibration testing,
the delay of the C&DH subsystem (and its subsequent
impact on flight software development/testing), and
redesign of star tracker placement. As a developmental
system many problems were discovered and corrected
with the final tally of Problem Failure Reports listed at
184 unique items.

Finally, testing and analysis for radiation susceptibility
(a key component of small satellite reliability) can be
effective tools if implemented carefully.
A key
component in the TacSat-3 system was the high speed
interface between the Sensor Processor and the
Common Data Link modem. To satisfy the legacy
design of the CDL system and provide sufficient data
throughput, a high speed link was required. This link is
well established for terrestrial and airborne systems, but
had no spaceflight heritage. Implementation on the
Sensor Processor (SP) side was originally specified to
be within an existing COTS component, and
implementation on the CDL side was within an FPGA
(Field Programmable Gate Array).
As FPGA
architectures in space have been well characterized, risk
was deemed to be low for that interface. However, the
„COTS‟ part had no known analogue. AFRL chose to
push for radiation testing as a risk mitigation effort.
The „COTS‟ part failed at very low particle energy
levels (2 MeV). This failure forced a redesign (to the
FPGA implementation) of the Sensor Processor high
speed link to CDL, and likely saved the mission.

The first delivered item to Kirtland was the ARTEMIS
payload. ARTEMIS payload testing was reviewed by
the AFRL systems engineering team and the AI&T
team, and a decision was made to perform additional
random vibration testing to determine survivability on
the original focus mechanism design. The test was
halted below acceptance levels to allow for a backup
rework of the focus mechanism structure. Upon further
inspection, however, it was determined the
spectrometer had structurally failed. ARTEMIS was
shipped back to Raytheon for repair. The required
repair was extensive, and resulted in a 9-month delay in
schedule.

Integration And Test Phase Overview
A key feature of the AFRL space flight mission
assurance process is the reliance on independent
Integration and Test at the Space Vehicle level. While
different programs have different structures and
approaches to integration, the common denominator is
system level test performed by an independent
AFRL/contractor team.
Independence is carried
throughout the program, and the AI&T (Assembly,
Integration and Test) Team Lead reported directly to
the Program Manager and was equal to the Chief
Engineer (head of the government engineering team).
The intent of this independent test paradigm is to allow
for technology development discovery as well as
demonstrating a significant cost/schedule savings over
traditional programs while maintaining high levels of
Straight

In parallel, the spacecraft bus was delayed due to
developmental issues on the C&DH as well as
manufacturing issues with the Power Control
Electronics (PCE). A decision to deliver the spacecraft
bus early (without the C&DH and with Engineering
Model PCE) was made to allow the AI&T team to start
their efforts in an attempt to save schedule. The C&DH
was subsequently delivered 4 months after the
spacecraft bus and the PCE was delivered 6 months
after the spacecraft bus. The delays in these two key
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components delayed a majority of the AI&T bus system
level testing. Ultimately, both the ARTEMIS repair
and these components competed for a position on the
program schedule‟s critical path.
As critical components were introduced, the AI&T
team discovered normal developmental test issues such
as incorrect build vs. documentation, interface
discrepancies, software bugs, and various minor design
issues. However, a major deficiency in the placement
of the star trackers on the ARTEMIS payload was
discovered. The original design called for the star
trackers to be placed on the same bay pointed aft
looking through the gap between two solar panel wings.
The edges of the star tracker baffle Earth exclusion
zone were close to the edges of the solar wings. It was
demonstrated that very low illumination on the solar
wing edges would blind the star trackers. A joint team
including AFRL, Aerospace Corporation, ATK Space,
and Raytheon conducted a design study to review the
issues, and the location of the star trackers was changed
to minimize the potential for the problem. On-orbit
performance has confirmed that the design change was
effective.

Figure 6. TacSat-3 in Random Vibration Test
Functional testing, systems-level thermal vacuum,
random vibration testing, and factory compatibility of
the communications links were successfully completed
and the spacecraft was ready for shipment to NASA‟s
Wallops Island Flight Facility when another anomaly
was discovered. With the spacecraft literally on the
loading dock in preparation for shipment to the launch
site, the manufacturer of the spacecraft transponder
used for up-linking commands determined that some
parts were not built to specifications by a supplier and
could potentially fail during launch. The manufacturer
recommended that the parts be replaced. This involved
removing the transponder from the spacecraft, shipping
it back to the manufacturer for parts replacement and
requalification and reinstallation into the satellite. The
end result was a three-month delay, which was used by
the AFRL team to complete additional functional
testing of the spacecraft systems and software.
Integration and test was finally completed in March
2009 and the satellite was shipped to Wallops Island.
Integration and Test Phase Lessons Learned
Highlights
Integration and test for TacSat-3 was a validation of the
AFRL independent AI&T concept. Lessons include a
strong validation of adherence to the „test like you fly‟
concept, flexibility as delays occur in the
development/acquisition phase of the program,
commitment to a minimum mission assurance level,
and finally the ability to innovate while being mindful
of cost and schedule impacts. Finally, experienced test
personnel were absolutely key to the mission success.
Although new personnel were taught during the course
and provided irreplaceable contributions, the key
experiences of the AI&T Team Lead to discern the
criticality of problems and work around them ensured
mission success while managing cost and schedule
impacts.

Figure 5. Artist rendition of TacSat-3: note the
deployed solar array configuration

Straight
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procurement as well as rework queues meant a major
schedule (and subsequent cost) impact. The delay
could have been greater than a year. A process was
developed to „upscreen‟ parts from the bad lots, which
resulted in the ability to rework the radio prior to other
higher priority missions who required new parts. This
risk paid off on 19 May 09 with a successful first
contact. No problems in the radio have been found.

As discussed above, the ability of the original delivery
of ARTEMIS to survive launch loads was brought into
question due to low margins on the focus mechanism.
Original vibration tests were only specified to be
performed at the workmanship level to save on cost &
schedule. However, after an independent review by the
AFRL team, a more representative flight-like vibration
test was deemed necessary. This allowed the early
identification of not only the focus motor problem, but
the failure of the spectrometer. Had this occurred later
in the system-level environmental testing, repairs would
have been much more costly in terms of impact to the
program.

Operations Phase Overview
Tactical Satellite-3 experiment operations started on 19
May 2009 upon a successful launch from Wallops
Island, VA. Mission operations were led by the Air
Force Research Laboratory, but included several
mission partners throughout the country. The primary
mission was to experiment with tactical operations,
validate and measure the utility of hyperspectral
imagery, and support the secondary experiments. As a
new technology capability experiment, mission
operations were divided into three distinct phases:
Launch and Early Orbit (LEO), Calibration, and
Validation phases.

As problems or failures occur in test, the ability to
modify the original sequencing of activities becomes
critical. The ability to maintain flexibility while
maintaining a high level of mission assurance was a key
to the TacSat-3 success. This flexibility resulted from
open lines of communication that enabled rapid
decision making that also took into account the impacts
on mission assurance.
This flexibility was also
balanced with the Program Manager‟s insistence on a
minimum amount of mission assurance. As with any
technology development and test program, discovery of
previously unknown behavior introduces potential risk
and can have negative impacts on cost and schedule.
Maintaining mission assurance was key to the decision
to relocate the star trackers. There were analyses which
showed the original placement was adequate, but tests
showed a high likelihood of blinding the star trackers.
Although movement of the star trackers caused a
significant delay in the program and a major rework of
flight hardware, the commitment to mission assurance
took priority, leading to a highly successful mission.
This commitment did not stifle innovation, but actually
enhanced it. During the star tracker blinding resolution
process several options were assessed. Through the
combined AFRL, ATA-Aerospace, ATK and Raytheon
teams the impact of the move to cost and schedule were
minimized. In fact, several software tests were able to
be pulled up in priority.
Innovation was also
demonstrated in the test design through bagging the
spacecraft and rolling it outside to track stars while
shining lights on solar array simulators. The results of
these tests were critical to understanding the impact of
the problem.

Figure 7. TacSat-3 Launch
Launch and Early Orbit is the critical phase of
stabilizing the spacecraft and checking out all systems
and sensors. This typically requires several weeks of
work. Launch and Early Orbit‟s primary objectives
were to launch the space vehicle, ensure the space
vehicle met a minimal level of functionality, and finally
characterize a minimal level of performance to declare
its operational status. One of the mission objectives
calls for developing traceability to deliver a new
capability on orbit within 7 days; 24 hours of which
includes the LEO phase of the mission. As TacSat-3 is

Innovation was also demonstrated when a parts issue
became apparent less than a week from shipment to the
launch site. The primary TT&C radio was deintegrated
from the spacecraft in less than 2 hours, ready to ship
back to the manufacturer. Availability of replacement
parts became a major issue, as the TacSat-3 was
inherently a lower priority mission. Delays in parts
Straight

7

24th Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

operations were learned or confirmed during this phase.
First among these lessons was to demonstrate the value
of sufficient margin in the space system design. The
spacecraft bus design included
intentionally
conservative estimates for power generation and usage
limitations, resulting in a highly robust power system
that has always been power positive during all planned
activities. Due to the considerable power margins, the
amount of planned experiments was expanded,
providing a more successful overall mission.

a developmental system, this timeline was deemed to be
too aggressive. Additionally, there were legitimate
concerns to allow outgassing to preserve the system‟s
optical capabilities. Even with these safeguards, the
first image was taken less than 72 hours after launch
with all systems functioning within expected
parameters.
The actual exit of the Launch and Early Orbit campaign
occurred 20 days after launch. The schedule driver was
to demonstrate reliable downlink via the high speed
rates required for mission execution. The spacecraft
was checked out with minimal safety issues, and an
initial performance baseline was established. Due to
the delay in high speed downlink reliability, AFRL
chose to start Calibration Phase activities 7 days after
launch.

The validation phase demonstrated sufficient utility
along with sufficient margins in order to consider the
use of the system after the 1 year AFRL
experimentation. While this „residual‟ operations phase
was not necessarily planned for, it demonstrates a
portion of the success of the TacSat-3 mission.

The Calibration Phase consisted of iterating the system
parameters to refine the performance baseline. This
phase lasted until 19 Aug 09 (three months after
launch). The planned duration of this period was 6
weeks, but delays were a function of the small team
used in operations, bad weather at our primary
calibration sites, lack of understanding of the severity
of ARTEMIS thermal mis-design on the sensor ability
to focus and thus to be calibrated, and ensuring we
could predict mission performance in the validation
phase. At the conclusion of the calibration phase the
following items were accomplished:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Operations Phase Lessons Learned
Preparation for TacSat-3 mission operations took place
over approximately the last 18 months before launch.
Four mission ops rehearsals were conducted involving
the entire team, as well as several exercises and drills.
As with all experimental missions, many lessons were
learned despite extensive preparations.
Perhaps the most critical lesson learned from the
experiment operations phase was about the role of
mission planning, and the structure of the team. The
original TacSat-3 ops team structure did not account for
mission planning activities other than the normal
contact planning done for nominal activities such as
stored state of health downlink. As the mission
progressed from the LEO phase and checkout activities,
it became obvious that the planning activities, including
data collect planning, scheduling for CDL downlinks
and secondary payload operations, and working in
system calibration activities, was a much larger job than
originally anticipated – at least a one-and-a-half to twoperson job. The structure of the ops team was modified
to include a mission planner position, filled by
members of the chief engineering team. In addition, a
room next door to the TacSat-3 Mission Operations
Center was modified specifically to become the
planning cell, equipped with mission planning tools and
access to vehicle telemetry.

Sensor operations normalized and
characterized with temperature sensors
Comparison of pre-launch measurements and
consistent with post-launch measurements
All sensor collection modes functional and
provided data consistent with pre-flight
estimates
Telescope focus established
Spectral & radiometric performance quantified
Collected data against known calibration target
areas
End-to-end processing chain validated
(spacecraft to scientist)
Demonstrate tactical concept of operations
baseline to support validation experimentation

The Validation Phase of the mission was primarily to
demonstrate the hyperspectral imaging concept in a
variety of uses. This phase consisted of tactical testing,
evaluation of mission data for military purposes,
complete characterization of mission performance, and
finally, providing enough statistical data on the
technology performance to inform any possible future
acquisition.
Several lessons in small spacecraft

Straight

The original TacSat-3 ops team chain of command
included a position called the EXCO, or External
Coordinator. This position was invented for the TS-3
ops team, intended to be a specialist for interfacing with
the many partners of the TacSat-3 team. As the mission
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carried the same name, regardless of which version it
was. This situation made configuration control more
difficult than it might have been; the lesson learned
here was that going forward, modules in use on board
should be uniquely identifiable and that information
should be available in telemetry.

planning role expanded, the External Coordinators
became Experiment Coordinators, and their job
expanded as well to shoulder most of the duties of
experiment and collect planning.
The number of activities going on concurrently during
mission operations, especially during LEO, can lead to
communication difficulties. This was especially true
for TacSat-3, with its large number of external mission
partners. Keeping all stakeholders abreast of the
current and planned ops required that new tools be put
in place to ease planning and communication pathways.
A weekly ops meeting with all stakeholders was
initiated. A weekly plan was also initiated, containing
all activities that the planning team desired to
accomplish in a given week. The plan was presented at
the meeting for stakeholder input, then published for
access by all members of the team. The combination of
plan and meeting solved not only the communication
and stakeholder input difficulties, but also gave the
mission planning cell an invaluable tool for organizing
and scheduling objectives.

SUMMARY

A second critical lesson learned from TacSat-3
experimental operations involved the role of scripting
in operations. Recent AFRL missions have taken
advantage of ground scripting to expedite the build of
complex commands and to enable system experts to
transition out to other duties. Ground scripting allows a
minimal crew with less experience to repeatedly
generate complex commands with minimal parameter
changes quickly and with little chance for human error.
An additional benefit of this ability was demonstrated
on TacSat-3, where the flexibility of ground scripting
provided a work-around in cases where the autonomy
portion of the flight software could not be easily
changed. Ground scripting allowed commands to be rebuilt in different sequences with different timing delays,
and then the scripts could be re-used later to build other
iterations of the same activity. The TacSat-3 team was
not large (3-6 people staffing most positions, many of
which needed at least on-call coverage 24 hours a day),
and it was critical that personnel be used as efficiently
as possible. Scripting of many ops activities also
allowed for more efficient use of ops team personnel.

Figure 8. Sample ARTEMIS images
In summary, TacSat-3 was a successful AFRL small
satellite mission, focused primarily on the ARTEMIS
hyperspectral sensor (sample images given in Figure 8)
and tactical use of small satellites. Lessons learned
from the development, I&T, and experimental
operations of TacSat-3 and ARTEMIS will be carried
forth to future AFRL flight experiments.
As
technology advances, it demonstrates the utility of
small spacecraft to make meaningful impacts in support
of our national defense. On 12 Jun 10, the TacSat-3
system was handed over to Air Force Space Command
as an operational leave-behind capability.
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The TacSat-3 flight software design contained many
task modules as well as tables used by the GNC
software. Modules could be interchanged for a new
version of the same module, as could tables; however,
there was no indication in telemetry which version of a
module was in use. The GNC tables had a similar
problem: A table used for a given purpose always
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